Other forms of Life? (fine tuning)
Let us once again look at the first four statements of the fine-tuning argument:
1. It is conceptually possible to change physical laws and constants from observed values.
2. Conceptually changing some constants from their observed values (independently) would make the universe uninhabitable for life as we know it. NOTE: What I mean by changing “independently” is when someone changes the constant value in their equation without changing the value(s) of any other constants.
3. The constants have an extremely large range of conceptually possible values.
4. Therefore, the number of values that permit life is very small.
Obviously, “life as we know it” (Premise 2) is not necessarily the same as life period. After all, there could be very different forms of life in a universe with different constant values. This certainly seems to undercut the vast majority of fine-tuning arguments. However, William Lane Craig, in his debate with Victor Stenger, brings up the point that some of the ‘finely tuned’ constants have to do with whether chemistry would exist or not (and it is certainly a reasonable assumption that all forms of life will depend on a pre-existent chemistry) and so the ‘other forms of life’ argument, while weakening the fine-tuning argument considerably, does not quite destroy it, for there is still some fine-tuning to be explained.